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Introduction 
In this chapter, I use the term discourse in a very specific way. My usage concerns 
meaning repertoires, through which we filter our experiences. When people talk about 
something or when we act, we draw on or activate certain meaning-resources or 
discourses.2 We often do so within dominant discourses, which characterise ways of 
talking, writing, thinking, behaving and theorising that prevail at certain times in certain 
arenas of life. How do these taken-for-granted ways of being define or position people in 
particular ways? How do they act to legitimise particular kinds of behaviour? What 
assumptions does a particular discourse contain about what is normal or desirable? 
Whose position is strengthened or weakened by what is focused upon or what is ignored 
within a particular discourse? What discourses are muted or unacknowledged? What 
discourses might one expect to find concerning a theme, but which are noticeable by their 
absence? Such questions are a necessary concern for the reflective practitioner.  
 
I first encountered discourse in the sense considered in this chapter, in 1990, in a book 
called Losing Out, by Sue Lees (1987). I was bowled over by how strongly the concept 
resonated with my experience, and by Lees’ analysis of how discourses both reflect and 
create social reality. At that time, I was a teacher in a co-educational second-level 
school. I was concerned that, although the school had all kinds of equal-opportunities 
policies in place, girls often were disadvantaged because they spent a lot of time coping 
with comments about their sexuality or sexual ‘reputation’.  And there was a widespread 
assumption among staff and students that it was natural or normal for girls to have to do 
this. People assumed that, although it was unfortunate, the task for girls was to learn to 
deal with it. Among those who didn’t like it or who felt it was unfair, there was a feeling 
of powerlessness, and no books or manuals on equality had anything useful to offer. The 
only real option open to a girl accused of being a slut was to deny it. The truth or 
otherwise of the accusation had nothing to do with it; to call a girl a slut was to put her 
down, disempower her or ‘keep her in her place’ and to negate any other power or 
authority she might have. The same discourse could be employed to disempower a 
woman teacher. Boys and men teachers could be subject to discourses surrounding 
homosexuality (see Ryan, 1992, 1997).  
 
It was extremely difficult to contest the notion that sexuality was at the heart of a girl’s 
identity. Within the discourses circulating in the school at that time, there was no 
discourse that made active female sexuality okay. Nor was there a discourse that had as 
its central premise that it was unacceptable to reduce everything to sexuality, where girls 
and women were concerned.  
 
Not a great deal has changed in the 23 years since Lees published her study. In modern 
societies, it is now widely acceptable to talk about sex, but the discourses that shape how 
we talk about it remain largely similar to the discourses identified by Lees. Discourses 
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still circulate, which have a central premise that sex and sexuality are at the heart of how 
a girl or woman can be judged.  
 
I have used the concept of discourse in research on schooling, personal development 
education, feminist identity, marriage, economic growth, sustainability and balanced 
living and transformative learning (see Ryan 1997, 2001a,b, 2003, 2004). I have also 
drawn on discourse analysis in my teaching, and in my professional and personal lives I 
have tried to be an activist for discursive change. In this chapter, I want to set out some of 
the general principles of a discourse approach, and am guided by questions generated 
over several years by students, colleagues, people commissioning and funding research, 
and friends.  
 
 
Specific usage of the term discourse 
In this chapter, then, I use the term ‘discourse’ as developed by Foucault (1979, 1980, 
1991), and further developed by poststructuralist theorists, many of whom are cited 
throughout the text. This usage is distinct from how, in journalism and some other parts 
of everyday life, the term ‘discourse’ is often now used as a synonym for conversation, 
debate, talk or dialogue. Another usage of the term discourse – probably somewhere 
between the usage in this chapter and the more general usage -- is that of Mezirow 
(2003), who draws on the work of Habermas (1984). For Mezirow, discourse is a 
‘critical-dialectical’ dialogue that involves assessing the beliefs, feelings and values of 
others, ‘to arrive at a tentative best judgement’ (Mezirow, 2003: 59). 
 
Discourses, as treated in this chapter, are ‘socially organised frameworks of meaning that 
define categories and specify domains of what can be said and done’ (Burman, 1994: 2). 
They form regimes of truth, which ‘present a distinct object of study, rather like 
Durkheimian social facts, except that they exist in a state of fluidity and are coextensive, 
as knowledge, with movements of power’ (Ransom, 1993: 131). This approach to 
discourse is useful for systematic enquiry into how we know the world, and how ways of 
knowing can serve to regulate us or to liberate us.  
 
Discourse is implicated in how we understand ourselves as persons, in how we interpret 
what we see around us and what we experience, and in how we construct meaning about 
ourselves, our groups and the world at large. We are all inserted into a myriad of different 
discourses, some competing with and some complementing each other. Discourses 
provide positions within which we can locate ourselves. They also allow us to position 
other people and they allow other people to position us.  
 
A discourse approach facilitates exploration in a systematic way of ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions about human and social relations, from the intimate to the international. If we 
talk about sex, human rights, work, childcare, economics, or global warming, to name 
just a few themes, we activate and draw on discourses, in order to make sense of what is 
going on and to guide our actions. The meaning-resources and sense-making repertoires 
constitute the discourses.  
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Identifying discourses is a way of describing and analysing what happens in social and 
human relations. But discourses also shape social relations and have actual effects on 
practice and identity. Discourses are real, with real effects. They are not just a reflection 
of reality; they have an objective reality (Ransom, 1993: 131); they are concepts, but they 
are also more than concepts. The point of analysing discourse is not simply to expose a 
heretofore hidden meaning, but to question and disrupt ways of understanding that are 
taken as unchanging and unquestionable truth (cf Davies, 2004: 7).  
 
Discourse analysis can support discourse activism and can give a rigorous theoretical 
underpinning to our projects for a better world. The rigour of discourse analysis is not 
intended to replace the activist’s desire to contribute to human and planetary flourishing, 
but to enhance the passion that underpins that desire. In this way, we can strengthen our 
contribution.   
 
 
Some practical distinctions: sites, themes and discourses 
It can be tempting to characterise everything as a discourse. This may arise from the 
popularisation of the term in recent years. But if we allow the term discourse to include 
everything in the social world, it lessens the usefulness of the concept as a tool for 
reflective practice. For rigour and systematic analysis, and to allow us to examine many 
different features of a phenomenon – all of which lend credibility and reliability to a 
study or a plan for creating change -- it is worth distinguishing between a number of 
terms such as sites, themes and discourses.  
 
I am not trying to make rigid rules here about what terms are used (for instance, a site 
could be termed a field or an arena, even a problem or an issue; a theme might be thought 
of as a category; a discourse, as already outlined, could be called a meaning repertoire, an 
interpretive resource, a lens, a way of understanding or a filter for experience). The 
important thing is to be consistent in how one uses the terms in one’s work. My purpose 
is to show the value of clarifying among different kinds of terms and of using them 
consistently in one’s approach to analysis or writing. 
 
For example, a work organisation or group could be thought of as a site, and within that 
site, one theme is usually the purpose of the organisation or group (other themes might be 
pay, working conditions, staff development). Another theme could be some kind of 
problem or issue confronting the organisation or the group. Surrounding any theme, one 
will find a number of discourses. In other words, when people talk, write or think about 
the theme, we activate different meaning frameworks. The discourses we activate depend 
on our differential experience, discursive exposure and political alignments (cf Alloway 
and Gilbert, 2004: 100). If we take the theme of the purpose of a work organisation, we 
may see in action discourses such as value for money, public service, social 
transformation, human development, shareholder profit, cost-effectiveness, 
competitiveness and so on (see for example Lange 2004). Sometimes these discourses 
stand in opposition to each other, so that participation in one makes participation in 
another untenable. And sometimes discourses nest together comfortably.  
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Within the site or arena of marriage, one finds many themes, such as love, children, 
childcare, housework, money, sex and so on. The discourses that arise concerning those 
themes include discourses of blame, responsibility, correct order, equity versus equality, 
less is more, lack of choice and normality (see Ryan, 2001b). Several different discourses 
can be in play concerning any one theme, such as housework or childcare (ibid). And of 
course, the site of marriage is nested within other sites, such as contemporary 
heterosexual relations, homosexual relations, and contemporary society.    
 
One could also treat as a site a political or social action or movement, or attempts to 
create new social forms, as well as any struggle or resistance. For example, the make-
poverty-history marches of 2006-7 were events (technically, sites) within the bigger site 
that is the global justice movement. And some sites are more abstract than others. We 
don’t actually ‘see’ them even though we are aware of them, as with education, work, 
employment or the media.  
 
Sometimes we miss certain sites completely because our eyes are not attuned to them. 
We can be positioned in such a way in a discursive field, that we take certain sites as the 
norm, for example, sites such as heterosexuality, whiteness or ability. They do not ‘show 
up’ for us. And the voices of those who do see the site may be muted within the overall 
discursive climate.  
 
The same discourse – or variations on it -- can often be found in operation across 
different sites/arenas and themes. For instance, discourses concerning essential gender 
differences can occur across arenas as diverse as defence, peace-keeping, heterosexual 
relations, education, sexual activity, care and housework.  
 
 
Describing a discourse 
Discourses are fluid and they shift and shape-change with the times and their 
geographical locations. Nevertheless, it is necessary in any discourse analysis to try to pin 
down what their premises are and how they take effect. One cannot decide if a discourse 
is enabling, or if it needs to be challenged or changed, if one cannot describe it 
adequately. Drawing loosely on the work of Foucault and taking into account the work of 
other commentators and my own research, I offer three groups of guidelines for 
practitioners engaging in discourse analysis or discourse activism 
1. Ask what the central premise of the discourse is. The premise of a discourse can 
frame or underpin what is actually said or done, even though the premise is not 
named or talked about. Ways of making sense are not always obvious or 
transparent. The task of the discourse analyst is to expose the premises that go 
unstated, so that we can judge for ourselves whether they are good enough or 
acceptable for the kind of society we want to create and live in.  
2. Examine how a discourse is deployed. Also examine the present-moment 
relations that affect how a discourse plays out in any particular situation, site, 
arena, or in relation to a particular theme. Discourse is not fixed, but constantly 
shifting 
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3. What conditions facilitate or militate against a discourse being widely circulated? 
How powerful, acknowledged or muted each one is will depend on the general 
discursive climate. 
 
 
Discourse and power 
Power is mobilised when speakers or social actors activate consensus about what is the 
case (cf Cherryholmes, 1988: 180). A discourse or its premises may not be openly stated, 
but they can still come to hold the status of truth. The ways that we form meaning are 
central to any consideration of power, because meaning is implicated in shaping and 
regulating the conduct of human beings (cf Reynolds and Wetherell, 2003: 493). For 
instance, calling someone a slut is appealing to a ‘truth’ or premise about women and 
girls: that it is normal, natural or acceptable to judge them by their sexual activity. But 
this premise may never actually be articulated in the daily usage. Nevertheless, it can 
come to be regarded as truth or reality. People recognise the discourse, although they may 
not name it. They will either comply with, resist or seek to transform certain discourses.  
 
Another illustration of different discourses and the power differentials among them arises 
in a discussion about bringing ashore gas from the Corrib Field, through a Shell pipeline, 
in Rossport, Co Mayo. Garavan (2009) shows how several local people draw on a group 
of discourses that differ fundamentally from those of Shell (and the government). Those 
opposing the pipeline draw on discourses of belonging, attachment, progress and time, 
which are entirely different from those of the pro-pipeline people. The discourses 
deployed by the advocates of the pipeline are more powerful in ‘formal public decision-
making’ (ibid: 84). The local people can understand the Shell discourses, but the Shell 
people are unable or unwilling to use the local discourses to address the situation. The 
discourses of progress, time and money employed by Shell are modernist and rely on an 
exposition of ‘the facts’. The Shell discourse of consultation is summarised in the term 
‘presentation’, while the local people’s discourse of consultation involves ‘unravelling’ 
the issues (ibid: 88).  
 
Similar power differentials regarding discourses of consultation and participation have 
been noted at work in African development settings (George, 2010: 71-77). Bill Gates’ 
foundation, AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) has been seen as using a 
different discourse of participation from that of local people.  
You come. You buy the land. You make a plan. You build a house. Now you 
ask me what colour do I want to paint the kitchen? This is not participation. 
(African Farmer, cited by Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2010) 
 
Discourses are never innocent (Davies, 2004: 5) or neutral; they are saturated with 
meaning from the social world. Discourse analysis is a tool for seeing how power 
operates beyond its material and juridical aspects. Discursive power is often (although 
not always) subtle, because it is passed off as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’. Discourses of 
naturalness or normality have the capacity to mask the power of what appears to be 
benign. An unacknowledged discourse can give authority to the statements of a person or 
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to the policy documents of an institution; it can make acceptable a joke at someone’s 
expense, or give one person the power to demonstrate superiority over someone else.  
 
For the reflective practitioner, working with discursive power is just as important as 
working with economic, legal and material power. The strategies, tactics and techniques 
of power must be examined from the point of view of discourse also. The more subtle or 
less overt forms of violence and discrimination against subaltern groups are often 
discursive, and are evident in jokes, conversation, or subtle practices, for example. 
Discursive power differs from material and juridical power, but it is just as real. When 
immigrants or gay people are on the receiving end of physical violence, they will not call 
for a discourse analyst before phoning the police, a doctor or a refuge. If they experience 
discrimination, they may take a legal challenge. Nevertheless, to recognise the injustice 
of the central premises of racist or homophobic discourses is to open one’s eyes to how 
other kinds of power may be legitimised.  
. 
 
Discourse and ideology 
An ideology is  
the elevation of a particular set of perceptions, assumptions, and analyses to a 
normative belief system. It provides a framework by which adherents respond to 
events and developments. An ideology also makes it difficult to see beyond the 
framework, however, so events reflecting other perspectives may seem nonsensical. 
Modern life is structured by numerous ideologies that interlock and support each 
other. (Spretnak, 1999: 12).  
 
Foucault (1980) does not accept the term ideology. Nevertheless, many commentators 
believe that discourse is able to account especially well for the notion of ideology as 
common sense – the taken-for-granted – as developed in the work of Althusser (1971) 
and Gramsci (1971). It also has similarities with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, 
understood as sublety and nuance. And it resonates with Garfinkel’s (1967) 
conceptualisation of ‘natural attitude’. Discursive power is like ideology as common 
sense: unacknowledged and accepted assumptions may be present, which affect, frame or 
underpin what is actually said or done.  
 
The concept of discourse is, however, different from the Marxist notion of base and 
superstructure, where there exists an ideological superstructure, or a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
that has to be ‘seen through’ or displaced, in order to find the reality (the base) 
underneath.  
 
 
Discourse and poststructuralism 
The names we give to the concept of discourse do not really matter (I have already 
mentioned some other options for names, such as filters for experience, meaning-
repertoires, etc). The concept is a heuristic device. What does matter is the approach that 
informs the whole body of discourse theory within the critical poststructuralist tradition 
(see Davies, 2004). The body of thought that makes up critical poststructuralist theory is 
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itself a discourse that co-exists with other bodies of theory, which are also discourses. 
This critical post-structuralist tradition is interested in how we make history and how it 
unfolds. It is concerned with ‘the movement from one configuration to another … the 
lines of flight that make new realities’ (Davies, 2004: 7, original emphasis). The tradition 
strives to contribute to change and evolution; it is not satisfied with remaining simply an 
observer of the lines of flight of others (ibid).  
 
 
A hybrid approach to discourse analysis 
There are two main strands in the way researchers and commentators approach discourse: 
the top-down Foucauldian strand, and the ‘bottom-up’ strand, which has much in 
common with conversational analysis and grounded theory (see for example Henwood 
and Pigeon, 1992, cited in Day, Gough and McFadden, 2003). The Foucault-influenced 
top-down approach emphasises the way that language plays a part in constituting identity 
and meaning, by the discourses (interpretive repertoires) that are available in a culture. 
Some commentators note that with this approach a researcher or commentator may from 
the outset of any analytic process impose theoretical, political or other judgements on 
data, and fail to take into account locally created meanings. This can have the effect of 
elevating the researcher / commentator to a position of all-knowing arbiter, which can 
have anti-democratic effects (cf Peace, 2003: 165,6). The bottom-up approach is limited 
by ‘its strict adherence to participants’ orientations and to the unattainable ideal that a 
researcher can conduct an objective analysis free from any ideological baggage’ (ibid: 
164).  
 
In practice, few contemporary researchers, commentators or practitioners confine 
themselves strictly to one strand or the other. Some may concentrate on how meaning is 
accomplished and others may concentrate on the effects of the dominance of certain 
meanings and the absence of other possible meanings. But it is impossible to say that 
these two strands have nothing to do with each other or to say to each other. They have 
overlapping interests. The critical poststructuralist theoretical tradition advocates holding 
multiple positions at once, and simultaneously keeping an awareness of the potential 
imbalances of power.   
 
 
Reading the discursive climate, as well as individual discourses 
As well as examining individual discourses, in discourse analysis we also need to step 
back and look at the broader conditions that allow one discourse to succeed another (or 
not). Certain conditions allow certain ways of understanding to be created and to come to 
the fore, and they keep other ways of understanding in the background. Reynolds and 
Wetherell (2003) refer to the sum of these conditions as the discursive climate. They see 
the discursive climate as having similarities to the term ‘ideological field’, as proposed by 
Billig (1991, cited in Reynolds and Wetherell, 2003: 493) 
 
The discursive climate, as well as individual discourses, is important in considerations of 
power, resistance and change. It affects the legitimacy of, or lends authority to certain 
types of discourses. Feminism provides an example of this. An historical moment came 
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in which the discursive climate was such that it was possible to think of women as a 
group, whose position in the social network lacked power. Earlier, that simply was not a 
recognized lens through which to view women.  
 
A major theme in feminism is equality among women and men, in every area of life, 
including work. However, the overall discursive climate of modernity equates progress 
with economic growth and makes paid work a central feature of modern life (see Ryan, 
2009). This climate made some feminist discourses more likely to ‘catch on’ or resonate 
positively than others. The discourse that has come to dominate understandings of 
equality is that equality involves women being equal to the traditional male model in the 
workforce, where paid work takes precedence over other aspects of life-work, including 
care (for self, others and the earth). In the modern workplace, many women take on 
traditional male work patterns, or prioritise their jobs over other aspects of their lives, just 
like men were usually expected to do.  
 
The discursive climate of prioritising paid work has made it more likely that when people 
think of equality, this discourse of ‘women being like men’ would come to dominate. It 
has achieved the status of a ‘totalising discourse’ (cf de Cock, 1998) and has muted other 
discourses of work and equality, which promote the idea that men should spend less time 
in paid work, and participate more in unpaid and often economically invisible care work. 
More challenging and complex poststructuralist, postmodern and ecological discourses of 
work and equality (see Spretnak, 1999, Ryan, 2001, Standing, 2009), which do not ‘fit’ 
with the prioritisation of paid work, have resonated with much fewer people, because the 
discursive climate does not nurture them. Their central premises constitute fundamental 
challenges to modernist discourses of work. The challenges, if successful, would 
constitute genuine paradigm shifts. However, the discursive climate can be such that 
challenges to totalising discourses result in the challengers being positioned as 
incomprehensible or crazy.  
 
 
Discourse activism 
One can name a discourse, identify its central premise, show how it is deployed, and what 
effects it has. Having identified discourses and related practices, one could stop there, 
theorising in a detached and relatively neutral way. (It is only relatively neutral, because 
what we choose to study or to make the focus of our activities is never entirely neutral.) 
Dominant discourses are not easily critiqued, transformed, challenged or negotiated. 
They tend to be taken as natural, normal or ‘common sense’. 
 
Ultimately, though, the point is to disrupt oppressive discourses. The discursive arena is 
itself a site of politics, where action can take place for value-informed change. Discourse 
activism is aimed at transforming cultural paradigms (Young, 1997: 99), and discourse 
activists see such transformation as essential in efforts to bring about social justice.   
 
The concept of change is a very abstract one, which we use to make sense of how one 
way of knowing the world succeeds another. Because certain ideas are made, then they 
can be unmade, according to Foucault. He did not always show how people create new 
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discourses, but feminist, race and disability movements, among others, have at least 
partly achieved the creation of new ways of understanding the social world.  
 
Examining discourses and understanding the discursive climate is an essential part of 
challenging oppressive ways of making sense of people or of the world. The reflective 
practitioner can investigate how certain discourses can be challenged or ousted by 
discourses more adequate for the project of human and planetary well being.  
 
In any given situation, multiple discourses are likely to be activated, some of which are 
irreconcilable with each other, and this leads people to experience contradictions. 
Contradictory understandings and emotional responses can be an impetus for change. 
Contradiction, sympathetically treated, can also be the crack in the façade of dominant 
discourses. Contradictions are fertile ground for emerging new discourses of liberation. 
They are also a stimulus of creativity. In accepting and working with the experience of 
contradiction, we can learn to question and disrupt and create new discourses. 
Contradictions are a doorway to such change (Ryan, 2001a). 
 
Counterhegemonic discourses offer possibilities for new ways of knowing, and new ways 
for humans to be (subject positions). They provide resources for identity, as well as 
resources for solidarity with others. Discursive activism is usually collective. Individuals 
can take significant actions, but in order to create effective new discourses and get them 
into circulation so that they can have an effect, people have to work collectively.  
 
 
Discourse and history 
The dominant modern discourse about history is that it consists of inevitable ‘change’ or 
progress, where one element monotonously follows another, descending from the 
heavens as if pre-ordained (Bordo, 1993: 179), without any possibility that things might 
be different. Discourse analysis is one of the tools that help us to see the past as 
something much more complex than just a series of inevitable events in which humans 
played little or no part. Discourse plays a part in the evolution of social institutions and 
the emergence of regimes of truth (Foucault, 1979).  
 
Discourse analysis shows us that influential concepts and ideas – for example, the idea of 
learning outcomes, the at-risk child, the war on terror – were not just lying around 
waiting to be discovered; they are ideas that human beings constructed and made real, in 
particular historical circumstances and conditions. Ideas develop from the imaginations 
and intellects of human beings, living at different historical periods. 
 
In engaging in discursive-historical work, we can see that in the past there was usually 
more than one possible outcome, and that what has come to the fore has not necessarily 
been natural, or inevitable. We examine how one idea, and not another, comes to succeed 
(Ransom, 1993: 133). We ask what the circumstances are that allow a particular 
statement or belief ‘to acquire the quality of self-evidence or coherence’ (ibid: 132). 
What was the discursive climate that facilitated the emergence of certain ways of 
knowing, and made it more likely that other ways of knowing were muted or lost? 
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As Foucault puts it: 
My problem is to substitute the analysis of different types of transformation for the 
abstract, general and monotonous form of “change” which so easily serves as our 
means of conceptualising succession. (Foucault, 1991: 55-6, cited in Ransom, 1993: 
132-3, original emphasis) 
 
History seen in terms of discourse also gives us the important idea that the way events 
happen is not inevitable – but that the way things turn out is always contested and full of 
other possibilities. At a very broad level, for example, the kind of discourses of reason 
and what is entailed in being a rational human being, which have emerged as dominant in 
modern times, have always been contested. Modern-day rationality is usually confined to 
a particular kind of thinking, detached from feeling and imagination. And this kind of 
rationality has become somewhat of a hallmark of modern humanity.  
 
But in the past, fundamental challenges to modernist forms of rationality came from the 
Romantic movement, the Arts and Crafts movement, the cosmological and spiritual 
quests in schools of painting, the counter-modern modernists, Gandhi’s constructive 
programme and the counterculture of the 1960s and early 1970s (Spretnak, 1999: 135). 
The Romantics believed that only someone with acutely attentive and receptive 
sensibilities was capable of deep thought (ibid: 136).  
 
Many of these movements did not have great lasting influence. But they do live on in 
small pockets and traces and may come to the fore again. Some countercultural efforts 
did succeed, such as the landmark work of Erasmus, Copernicus and Galileo (Hogan, 
2003: 218). Ideas for social justice or for other ways of knowing, which people struggled 
to have accepted, have also often failed to win the day, and have been lost in the official 
histories, although they often survive in songs and stories. But if we are engaged in a 
struggle to challenge injustice and create a better world, which is part of the job of the 
reflective practitioner, it is useful to know that we are part of a significant and substantial 
lineage (Spretnak, 1999: 136). 
 
Discourse analysis is one way to achieve a more complex sense of the past, that is, a 
sense that the past is something that contained different possibilities. And when we see 
the past in this way, we can see the future as one that contains different possibilities also. 
This is in contrast to the dominant modernist discourse of the future, whose central 
premise is that change consists of more of what we have now, only speeded up or in more 
concentrated form.  
 
 
What a discourse approach cannot do 
If we look at all the discourses present in a situation, we can get a three-dimensional view 
(Middleton, 1998: 24) of how people make sense of a site, whether concrete or abstract. 
We can see a great deal of what is going on there; it is like doing theory in action (ibid). 
And what is going on is not just related to what people say, but to what they do and how 
they behave (actual practices) and sites of practice.  
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But discursive relations do not constitute the entirety of all possible social and political 
relations (see Cain, 1993: 79). The person – as speaker, actor, thinker, feeling being, 
theorist or change agent -- is largely absent from discourse analysis. This has benefits and 
disadvantages. The chief benefit is that, in analysing a discourse, one need not refer to the 
psychology of the individuals who draw on it or activate it. So one can discuss the 
premises of a discourse, how it operates, the effects it has, and how it can be challenged if 
it is oppressive. At the same time, one can avoid blaming those who use the discourse. 
But the downside is that discourse theory does not address all the complexities of how an 
individual experiences reality, what one might call the emotional realities of human life 
(Ramson, 1993: 133).  
 
We cannot see what is happening in terms of peoples’ internal responses to the content of 
a discourse, or to their positioning in a nexus of contradictory discourses. Everyone has a 
unique relationship to discourse, because each person has a unique history: emotional, 
physical, psychological, spiritual, cultural and so on. These histories create desire and 
anxiety, which are also filters for our experiences, as discourse is. Our unique histories 
help us to ‘act creatively on experience and transform it’ (Hollway, 2006: 16).  
 
Pure discourse analysis can also lead us to ignore our psychological or emotional 
investments in certain discourses; we may make these investments and form attachments 
to certain discourses because there is some kind of payoff for us. They may, for example,  
position us powerfully or promise us liberation (Alloway and Gilbert, 2004). Equally, 
discourse analysis alone cannot explain how and why people ‘let go’ of old discourses in 
order to move into uncertain futures (cf Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and 
Walkerdine, 1998: xvii). 
 
We make decisions in terms of what we find persuasive – if we are exposed to other 
discourses that we find persuasive, we may change our behaviour. But of course we also 
have to take into account emotional responses. Behaviour is not just a matter of rational 
persuasion. It is also about the fulfilment of desire. The drive to create change is 
inextricable from human desire. Discourse theory alone does not explain why a person 
chooses to resist an oppressive discourse. Hollway (2006) posits that one can have an 
emotional response to an oppressive discourse and a desire for a more humane discourse.  
She uses the case of the Robertson couple to illustrate this thesis (ibid: 115). In the 1950s 
in Britain, they initiated a then-revolutionary campaign for more humane treatment of 
children in hospital.  
 
The human person (the subject, or the self) is psychosocial and the entirety of human 
subjectivity must be taken into account in any analyses or moves for change. Subjectivity 
is the subjective sense of oneself, including ideas, beliefs and emotions. The self is far 
more than positions in discourse; it also has important emotional, imaginative, creative, 
unconscious and other internal dimensions. It can be construed as a dynamic three-way 
process among discourse, emotional responses and relations in the present moment 
(Ryan, 2001). ‘Discursive changes that accompany adult politicisation or actions for 
change are at the same time psychodynamic shifts or movements’ (Ryan, 2001: 57). 
Discourses play an important role here, in that they provide resources and content for 
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identity, but discourse theory does not give an adequate account of emotions, 
imagination, desire or anxiety.  
Discourses pre-exist individuals and enable the symbolisation of what is 
introjected, influencing the meaning that is achieved. But that meaning is 
also achieved through the creative imagination that characterises the 
internal world.  (Hollway, 2006: 129, emphasis added) 
 
The reflective practitioner has to be able to go further than discourse explanations or 
activism, which concentrate largely on the social or external aspects of human life. We 
need to examine life history, along with issues such as the experience of embodiment. 
These stress the importance for the person of specific experiences and relationships, such 
as those involved in being a child, or being parented, or parenting (Henriques et al, 1998: 
xv, cf Fleming, 2008). Experiences of place and nature also need to be taken into account 
(cf Spretnak, 1999). Imagination, empathy and identification with others are 
epistemological resources that drive change (cf Ransom, 1993: 134ff) and they also have 
ontological roots: the body and mind are related in important ways. 
 
Emotions, imagination, desire and anxiety have an undoubted discursive element to them. 
Imagination, for example, is constrained by the discursive resources available. And the 
ways that we understand personal feelings are also conditioned by discourse. But there is 
much more to these processes than discourse. If we were to make only a discourse-
oriented reading of them, we would be guilty of understanding the person as determined 
by discourse. The internal world of the individual is not confined to discursive content, 
although it consists partly of discursive content. We cannot ignore human creativity.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Once one has learned how discourses work – and they are present in all arenas of human 
life – it is impossible not to be aware of them, and equally impossible to ignore their 
importance. There are limits to what discourse analysis can offer, but discourse remains a 
crucial element of power relations, and discourse analysis and activism remain very 
useful tools for the reflective practitioner. They help us to combine a deep analysis of the 
realities of our time with a moral and political commitment to resisting injustice and 
ecological degradation, while at the same time promoting justice and ecological security  
 
Discourse can be used in research, teaching, learning and activism. The job of the 
reflective practitioner is to look at the everyday, the things that are familiar in our worlds, 
and to ask if they are adequate for the projects of equality, enablement and justice that are 
dear to our hearts. Discourse analysis is a tool for this kind of work. It helps us to build 
our capacities for reflexivity, as well as for participation in progressive social change, in 
collective efforts with others. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 Thanks to Rose Malone for comments on an early draft of this paper.  
2 Discourses are not the only resources we activate to create meaning, as I outline towards the end of this 
chapter. But they are the chief focus of this chapter. 
 
